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New Wine in an Old Chalice: The Ministerial 
Exception’s Humble Roots 
INTRODUCTION 
Though she had earned two promotions during her 16-year career 
with Lockheed Martin in New Orleans, Ms. Agnes Motton read one 
particular office memorandum in 1995 with disappointment.1 Her 
employer had selected other candidates to fill the open Control 
Mechanic positions for which she had interviewed.2 Oddly, all four of 
them were male.3 
Confident in her claim, Motton sued Lockheed Martin on unjust 
discrimination grounds.4 After establishing her prima facie case, 
Motton further asserted her superior qualifications as compared to 
those hired.5 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal agreed, 
finding that Motton’s length and breadth of experience surpassed 
those of two hired Control Mechanics.6 Although Lockheed Martin 
disputed the allegations, it could not muster a legitimate reason for 
failing to promote Motton.7 Ultimately, the court held Lockheed 
Martin accountable for intentional sex discrimination against 
Motton, signaling legal and societal intolerance for unfair 
employment discrimination.8 
In jarring contrast with this result, if Lockheed Martin had been 
a religious institution and Motton had applied for a position 
entailing ministerial duties, all other facts being equal, the 
ministerial exception may have squelched Motton’s sex 
discrimination claim. As a mechanism “rooted in the First 
Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom,”9 the judicially 
created ministerial exception precludes courts from adjudicating 
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 1. See Motton v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 900 So. 2d 901, 906–07 (La. Ct. 
App. 4th 2005) (per curiam). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Id. at 907. 
 4. Id. (“Subsequently, Ms. Motton filed suit in state court under Louisiana’s 
employment discrimination statutes, alleging Lockheed intentionally discriminated 
against her in denying her a promotion to the Control Mechanic’s position based 
upon her sex and race.”). 
 5. See id. at 909–13. 
 6. Id. at 914 (“Based on each candidates [sic] qualifications, it seems 
reasonable to conclude the jury found Motton was clearly better qualified than 
Dennis Caddell and Willie Henderson.”). 
 7. Id. (“We find it reasonable to believe the fact finder, the jury, rejected 
Lockheed’s explanation for not hiring Ms. Motton.”). 
 8. Id. at 914–15 (“We find the trial court did not err by finding that 
Lockheed intentionally discriminated against Ms. Motton on the basis of sex.”). 
 9. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007). 




certain employment discrimination claims. By definition, the 
ministerial exception, as it has developed, “operates to exempt from 
the coverage of various employment laws the employment 
relationships between religious institutions and their ‘ministers.’”10 
Under the altered Motton facts, the ministerial exception would 
perhaps leave Motton without a legal remedy, and her religious 
employer would face no consequences whatsoever for its actions. 
Motton would not even get her day in court, illustrating a disconnect 
between largely similar factual scenarios yielding wildly different 
results. The crux of this rift juxtaposes two core values of American 
law and society—religious interests on one hand and protection 
against discrimination on the other. 
This Comment explores the viability of the ministerial exception 
in its current form against the backdrop of employment 
discrimination laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.11 These federal statutes protect 
employees from discrimination on several bases, including sex, 
religion, disability, and age. At present, the ministerial exception 
may prohibit any employment discrimination claim, while some 
statutory exceptions to Title VII permit discrimination only on the 
basis of religion.12 
In a palpable sense, the ministerial exception has expanded since 
its inception in McClure v. Salvation Army, which defined the 
exception’s scope as covering the church–minister relationship.13 
This broadening trend has opened the door for religious employers 
to discriminate against certain employees and then look to the 
ministerial exception as protection against legal action. It is 
precisely this shield that would thwart Motton’s discrimination 
claim in the hypothetical religious scenario. Such drastic expansion 
of the ministerial exception risks sacrificing employee safeguards 
against discrimination, which embody a critical societal policy. 
On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court for the first time 
recognized “such a ministerial exception” in Hosanna–Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, a case addressing whether the ministerial 
                                                                                                             
 10. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 800 
(4th Cir. 2000). 
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 12. The religious organization, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006), and religious 
curriculum, id. § 2000e-2(e)(2), exceptions exempt only discrimination based on 
religion. Title VII further contains a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) 
exception, which applies more broadly. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972). 




exception applied to a teacher at a Lutheran school.14 While the 
ministerial exception has varied in its application since McClure, 
Hosanna–Tabor presented an opportunity for articulation of a 
definitive ministerial exception inquiry. In view of the inconsistent 
results that ministerial exception jurisprudence has fostered, the 
need for a clarified standard is pressing.15 
In general, courts routinely cite the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses as grounds to apply the ministerial exception.16 In doing so, 
courts afford the First Amendment significant weight, particularly 
with the exception’s continued expansion. Perhaps refusing religious 
discrimination allowances entirely would constitute the most serious 
threat to the free exercise of religion. With its statutory exceptions, 
Congress indeed grants several exemptions.17 If these currently 
cover too little, the remedial expansion should occur through 
legislation instead of case law. 
Mindful of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hosanna–Tabor, this 
Comment argues chiefly that the ministerial exception moving 
forward should inquire whether the employer–employee relationship 
satisfies the original intent standard under McClure.18 Furthermore, 
any expansion or deviation from the pure, originally intended form of 
the ministerial exception, as courts have been apt to effect, must come 
from Congress. Extended or more numerous statutory exceptions 
would properly ensue, instead of leaving the ministerial exception to 
the unbridled whim of court discretion. Part I of this Comment 
provides the necessary background on federal employment 
discrimination laws and explores the pertinent exceptions to these 
regulations. After outlining the statutory exceptions, Part I then tracks 
the ministerial exception’s inception, expansion, and ascension to the 
high court. Part II analyzes the ministerial exception’s development 
and establishes its inconsistent application since McClure. Part II then 
demonstrates the need for a more consistent ministerial exception 
standard and endorses a narrow, original-intent approach. Part III 
surveys other scholarly recommendations to remedy the current 
ministerial exception, nodding more animatedly to the narrowing 
proposals. Part IV recognizes the ministerial exception’s interaction 
with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and addresses the 
potential problems that a narrow approach could prompt. Finally, 
                                                                                                             
 14. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 706 (2012). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B. The First Amendment provides: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 558–59. 




Part V emphasizes the Supreme Court’s unique opportunity with 
Hosanna–Tabor, evaluates the ruling’s utility, and proposes a more 
concrete ministerial exception inquiry for the future. Furthermore, 
Part V accentuates the Comment’s call for action: a definitive 
reaffirmation of the ministerial exception’s original intent, requiring 
any further protection for religious employers to come from 
Congress instead of arising as the product of a court’s discretion. 
I. FOUNDATION THROUGH EXPANSION: THE LAWS AND EXCEPTIONS 
A. Federal Employment Discrimination Laws and the Statutory 
Exceptions 
On the reasonable premise that discrimination, in all its various 
forms and particularly in employment, should be eradicated, 
Congress in the mid-to-late twentieth century passed three key sets 
of provisions to ensure protection from employment discrimination. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196419 contains the most 
sweeping set of protections, establishing that “it shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”20 To cast a wider net and protect 
against age and disability discrimination, Congress passed the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)21 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).22 With these 
measures, Congress sought to level the employment playing field 
and ensure equality across the working public. 
In setting these limits, Congress further considered which 
boundaries would constitute strict rules and which would be more 
flexible. Religion has, over time, triggered the malleability of these 
                                                                                                             
 19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 20. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 21. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011). The relevant section provides: “It shall be unlawful for an 
employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” Id. § 
623(a)(1) (2006). 
 22. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12217 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011). The relevant section provides: “No covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges 
of employment.” Id. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 2011). 




protections. Like most general rules, Title VII, the ADEA, and the 
ADA are subject to exceptions.23 Title VII is subject to a set of 
statutory exceptions due to three special allowances Congress 
wished to provide employers possessing certain religious attributes. 
First, the religious organization exception holds the Title VII 
prohibition on religious discrimination inapplicable to “a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”24 
Second, the religious curriculum exception exempts schools owned, 
supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or 
operating on a religious curriculum.25 These two statutory 
exceptions permit discrimination only on the basis of an employee’s 
or prospective employee’s religion—and not based on one’s race, 
sex, or national origin.26 Finally, the bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) exception authorizes otherwise unlawful 
practices “on the basis of [an employee’s] religion, sex, or national 
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national 
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”27 
In contrast with the religious organization and curriculum 
exceptions, the broad BFOQ exception permits discrimination on 
bases other than religion, though it does not apply to race and color. 
B. The Ministerial Exception 
Unlike the three statutory exceptions, rigid in their singular 
application to Title VII, the judicially created ministerial exception 
                                                                                                             
 23. Though beyond the scope of this Comment, the ADEA and ADA contain 
exceptions such as the ADEA’s BFOQ exception, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006), 
and the ADA’s “direct threat” defense, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2006).  
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
 25. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
subchapter . . . it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, 
college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire 
and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, 
or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in 
substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion 
or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum 
of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of 
learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.”). 
 26. Jamie Derin Prenkert, Liberty, Diversity, Academic Freedom, and 
Survival: Preferential Hiring Among Religiously-Affiliated Institutions of Higher 
Education, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 22 (2004). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 




pertains not only to Title VII but also to claims brought under both 
the ADEA28 and the ADA.29 To the present day, courts “have 
universally recognized that the First Amendment protects houses of 
worship from state interference with the decision of who will teach 
and lead a congregation,”30 prompting widespread adoption of the 
ministerial exception. While its application continues to develop, the 
ministerial exception “is grounded in the idea that the ‘introduction 
of government standards [in]to the selection of spiritual leaders 
would significantly, and perniciously, rearrange the relationship 
between church and state.’”31 More specifically, the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment32 are often implicated as 
mechanisms that “preserve[] a religious institution’s right to be free 
from governmental entanglement [with the] management of its 
internal affairs.”33 While circuit courts have employed varying 
approaches as to how the ministerial exception applies procedurally,34 
decisions largely have trended toward agreement that the ministerial 
exception “allows religious employers to avoid liability for 
discrimination when making employment decisions concerning 
employees who qualify as ministers.”35 
                                                                                                             
 28. EEOC v. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 
769, 777 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (“While the ministerial 
exception was first applied in the context of suits brought against religious 
employers under Title VII . . . the exception has been extended to suits brought 
against religious employers under the ADA.” (citing Hollins v. Methodist 
Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999))). 
 29. Id. at 777 n.6 (“Courts have also extended the ministerial exception to 
suits brought under the ADEA, the common law, and state law.” (citing Hollins v. 
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007))). 
 30. Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 
868, 880 (Wis. 2009). 
 31. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168–69 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 32. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also 
discussion infra Part IV.A–B. 
 33. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2008) (second alteration 
in original) (quoting Rweyemamu v. Cote, No. 3:05CV00969, 2006 WL 306654, 
at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2006), aff’d, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 34. Id. at 206 n.4; Hosanna–Tabor, 597 F.3d at 775. In a footnote, the 
Supreme Court recently clarified the matter, concluding that the exception 
“operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a 
jurisdictional bar.” Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (2012). 
 35. Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential 
Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1776 (2008). 




When applying the statutory exceptions, courts battle with 
statutory structure and language; however, the ministerial exception 
provides for a less consistent standard, hardly uniform in its 
application. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, courts tended to 
utilize a test similar to the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Hosanna–
Tabor—“[f]or the ministerial exception to bar an employment 
discrimination claim, two factors must be present: (1) the employer 
must be a religious institution, and (2) the employee must be a 
ministerial employee.”36 
To fall within the first prong’s religious institution category, “the 
employer need not be a traditional religious organization, such as a 
church, diocese, or synagogue, nor must it be an entity operated by a 
traditional religious organization. Rather, a religiously affiliated 
entity is considered a religious institution if its ‘mission is marked 
by clear or obvious religious characteristics.’”37 For the employee’s 
role to qualify as ministerial in nature, the Sixth Circuit, in line with 
other courts of appeals, “has instructed courts to look at the function, 
or ‘primary duties’ of the employee.”38 Provided that “the 
employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, 
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision 
or participation in religious ritual and worship,”39 the employee in 
question will satisfy the test’s second prong. 
The requirement that the finder of fact must carefully examine 
characteristics regarding each prong serves as the common thread 
across the test’s two components. Though unconcerned with 
statutory language, ministerial exception inquiries compel questions 
of whether particular qualities are present, similar in process to 
courts’ statutory exception inquiries.40 Unlike the statutory religious 
organization and curriculum exceptions, however, the ministerial 
exception permits discrimination in a broad sense, and “[f]or those 
few positions that the [ministerial] exception covers, its impact is 
significant.”41 
                                                                                                             
 36. Hosanna–Tabor, 597 F.3d at 778 (citing Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, 
Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
 37. Id. (citing Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225, 226 
(6th Cir. 2007)). 
 38. Id. (citing Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th 
Cir. 2007)). 
 39. Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical 
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
1514, 1545 (1979). 
 40. See, e.g., LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr., 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
 41. Prenkert, supra note 26, at 42. 




1. The Foundation: McClure v. Salvation Army 
At its core, the ministerial exception, as originally conceived, 
focuses on a far narrower set of circumstances than its expansion has 
encompassed. The landmark case of McClure v. Salvation Army42 
serves as the exception’s foundation. As the very first sentence of its 
opinion, the Fifth Circuit wrote: “The Salvation Army is a church 
and Mrs. Billie B. McClure is one of its ordained ministers.”43 From 
the literal beginning, the court set forth the church–minister44 
relationship, which, at the end of the day, comprises the exception’s 
most critical inquiry. Upon termination from her position, McClure 
sued The Salvation Army, “alleging that it had engaged in 
discriminatory employment practices against her in violation of Title 
VII.”45 The court framed the issue as centering on “whether Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . applies to the employment 
relationship between a church and its ministers and, if applicable, 
whether the statute impinges upon the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment.”46 
Cognizant of the issue’s import, the Fifth Circuit noted that 
“[r]estrictions on the free exercise of religion are allowed only when 
it is necessary ‘to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests 
which the state may lawfully protect’”47—a principle one must 
constantly bear in mind with the ministerial exception. In resolving 
the issue with McClure and her former status as a minister, the 
ministerial exception, whether the court realized it, was born. The 
Fifth Circuit harkened back to two earlier United States Supreme 
Court cases48 to inform its holding: 
                                                                                                             
 42. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 43. Id. at 554. 
 44. See id. at 555 (“After undergoing a two year training period at The 
Salvation Army’s Officers Training School, Mrs. McClure was commissioned as 
an officer [minister] in June, 1967.” (alteration in original)). 
 45. Id. The court continued: “More specifically, [McClure] alleged that she 
had received less salary and fewer benefits than that accorded similarly situated 
male officers, also that she had been discharged because of her complaints to her 
superiors and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] with 
regard to these practices.” Id. (second alteration in original). 
 46. Id. at 554–55. In other words, “[d]oes the application of the provisions of 
Title VII to the relationship between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure (a 
church and its minister) violate either of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment?” Id. at 558. 
 47. Id. at 558 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
639 (1943)). Such restrictions are likely due to the fact that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has many times recognized that the First Amendment has built a ‘wall of 
separation’ between church and State.” Id. 
 48. In Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), “the Supreme Court began to 
place matters of church government and administration beyond the purview of 




[T]he application of the provisions of Title VII to the 
employment relationship existing between The Salvation 
Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister[,] would 
result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious 
freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the 
free exercise clause of the First Amendment.49 
For the Fifth Circuit, “the relationship between an organized 
church and its ministers is its lifeblood.”50 By the court’s reasoning, a 
Title VII application to the church–minister relationship would “cause 
the State to intrude upon matters of church administration and 
government which have so many times before been proclaimed to be 
matters of a singular ecclesiastical concern.”51 Accordingly, this 
intrusion would leave the church “without the power to decide for 
itself, free from state interference, matters of church administration 
and government.”52 In essence, the Fifth Circuit removed itself from 
the proceedings, effectively concluding that The Salvation Army’s 
discrimination against McClure, if it occurred, would be left without a 
lawful remedy. 
2. The Expansion: Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists 
Courts have not advocated outright the ministerial exception’s 
abolition; rather, they have steadily expanded the doctrine. Courts 
have often cited the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Rayburn v. General 
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists53 as the source for the primary 
                                                                                                             
 
civil authorities.” McClure, 460 F.2d at 559. Additionally, the Supreme Court 
recognized in 1929 that “[i]n the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the 
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although 
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as 
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.” 
Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 
(1929)). 
 49. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 559. The court continued: “The minister is the chief instrument by 
which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship 
must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.” Id. It is critical 
to note the court’s consistent references to the church–minister relationship, which 
its holding is meant to protect. 
 51. Id. at 560. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 
(4th Cir. 1985). 




duties test:54 “As a general rule, if the employee’s primary duties 
consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, 
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in a 
religious ritual and worship, he or she should be considered 
‘clergy.’”55 In Rayburn, the Fourth Circuit simply needed to decide 
“whether a woman denied a pastoral position in the Seventh-day 
Adventist Church may charge that church with sexual and racial 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”56 
Though Rayburn may present nothing outside the realm of the 
ministerial exception freeing a church–minister relationship from the 
law, courts often cite Rayburn as authority to examine an 
employee’s function and duties to determine whether the exception 
applies.57 
Without question, the Fourth Circuit recognized the importance 
of staying out of key church matters.58 The court, however, shuffled 
past the narrower doctrinal inquiry in suggesting that “[t]he 
‘ministerial exception’ to Title VII first articulated in McClure v. 
Salvation Army . . . does not depend upon ordination but upon the 
function of the position.”59 In opening the door for a wider scope, 
Rayburn set the stage for the ministerial exception’s subsequent 
expansive application. 
3. The High Court: Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC 
In 2012, the Supreme Court had occasion to decide how Ms. 
Cheryl Perich, a Redford, Michigan, primary and elementary 
Lutheran school teacher, fit within the ministerial exception, or 
whether indeed she fit at all. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit had held 
Perich beyond the ministerial exception’s reach. The Supreme 
Court’s final word on Hosanna–Tabor prompted an opportunity to 
embrace the trending expanded test or reconstruct the ministerial 
exception theory, perhaps by harkening back to the doctrine’s 
                                                                                                             
 54. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 55. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bagni, supra note 39) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Id. at 1164–65. 
 57. See, e.g., Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455; Petruska, 462 F.3d 294. 
 58. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168 (“[P]erpetuation of a church’s existence 
may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its values, teach its message, 
and interpret its doctrines both to its own membership and to the world at large.”). 
 59. Id. at 1168–69 (citing EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th 
Cir. 1981)). 




intended purpose. Hosanna–Tabor exemplifies the continuing 
debate over the ministerial exception’s proper scope. 
a. The Facts: Perich’s Discrimination Claim 
As a Lutheran school, Hosanna–Tabor60 employs a faculty 
consisting of “two types of teachers: ‘lay’ or ‘contract’ teachers and 
‘called’ teachers.”61 The difference between teachers in these two 
categories informs the ministerial exception debate in this case. While 
lay or contract teachers are hired by the school’s Board of Education 
on a yearly basis, called teachers “[are] hired by the voting members 
of the Hosanna–Tabor Lutheran Church congregation on the 
recommendation of the Board of Education, Board of Elders, and 
Board of Directors.”62 To qualify as a called teacher, one must 
“complete ‘colloquy’ classes as required by the Lutheran Church–
Missouri Synod that focus on various aspects of the Christian faith.”63 
Upon completing the requisite training, a called teacher earns “the 
title of ‘commissioned minister.’”64 
In July 1999, Perich began her employment at Hosanna–Tabor 
as a contract teacher and worked as such for most of her first year. 
She soon completed her colloquy classes at Concordia College and 
“received her call from the Hosanna–Tabor Lutheran Church on 
March 29, 2000.”65 Perich taught for five years at Hosanna–Tabor 
until taking disability leave for the 2004–2005 school year. She had 
fallen ill in the summer of 2004 at a Hosanna–Tabor golf outing, 
with a condition eventually diagnosed as narcolepsy.66 Upon her 
doctor’s clearance, Perich wished to return to teaching.67 Her 
employer had other plans. Though failing to convince Perich to sign 
a peaceful release agreement,68 Hosanna–Tabor ultimately fired 
Perich due to her narcoleptic condition, voting to “rescind Perich’s 
call” in April 2005.69 Consequently, Perich filed an employment 
                                                                                                             
 60. “Hosanna–Tabor is a religious school that teaches kindergarten through 
eighth grades.” EEOC v. Hosanna–Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 
2d 881, 883 (E.D. Mich. 2008), vacated, 597 F.3d 769, 777 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 884. 
 67. See id. at 884–85. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 886. Ironically, though the discussion of a contract law issue is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, Hosanna–Tabor’s called teachers traditionally 




discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) on account of her disability under the ADA.70 
In response to the eventual suit in the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Hosanna–Tabor contended that Perich fit within the 
ministerial exception. If held to apply, the exception would prompt 
the court to refrain from interfering in the dispute altogether.71 
Though Perich’s title while teaching may have shifted from 
“contract” to “called,” nothing had changed about her position or 
day-to-day classroom tasks.72 In sum, when considering her 
religious obligations, including regularly scheduled prayers and 
devotionals,73 Perich’s “activities devoted to religion consumed only 
about forty-five minutes of the seven-hour school day.”74 
Once Hosanna–Tabor ascended to the Supreme Court, the nine 
justices found two contrasting sets of analyses and likewise two 
conflicting outcomes between the district court and the Sixth 
Circuit. The district court held Perich within the scope of the 
ministerial exception,75 freeing Hosanna–Tabor from any possible 
repercussions. The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed, allowing 
Perich’s ADA claim to proceed.76 
b. District Court Ruling: Within the Ministerial Exception’s 
Scope 
According to the district court, it was “prudent in this case to 
trust Hosanna–Tabor’s characterization of its own employee in the 
months and years preceding the events that led to litigation.”77 
                                                                                                             
 
“are hired on an open ended basis and cannot be summarily dismissed without 
cause.” Id. at 883. 
 70. Id. at 886. 
 71. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 72. Hosanna–Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (“After receiving her call, 
Perich’s employment continued unchanged in form from her time as a contract 
teacher. During her years with Hosanna–Tabor, Perich taught math, language arts, 
social studies, science, gym, art, and music. In addition, Perich taught a religion 
class for thirty minutes a day four days a week and attended a chapel service with 
her class for about thirty minutes once a week. About twice a year, Perich led the 
chapel service in rotation with other teachers.”). 
 73. Id. at 884 (“Perich also led her classes in prayer three times a day for a 
total of five or six minutes and, at least during her final year as a teacher at 
Hosanna–Tabor, Perich’s class engaged in a devotional for five to ten minutes 
each morning.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 892. 
 76. See EEOC v. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 
F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 77. Hosanna–Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 892. 




Because the school considered “Perich a ‘commissioned minister’ . . . 
[the district court] conclude[d] that Perich was a ministerial 
employee,” meaning that the court could make no further inquiry.78 In 
its reasoning, the district court looked to Perich’s label as a called 
teacher, noting that Hosanna–Tabor’s clear distinction between 
contract and called teachers demonstrates the school’s emphasis on 
the ministerial role of called teachers.79 To take the analysis one step 
further, the district court drew a direct parallel between called 
teachers and Lutheran ministers, emphasizing that attainment of the 
“called teacher” label creates “an employment relationship that 
appears to be governed by the same rules as the church applies to its 
ordained ministers.”80 
Aptly aware of how a ruling so favorable to Hosanna–Tabor 
could be perceived, the district court claimed that this “[was] not a 
case where the defendant seeks to prove ministerial status after the 
fact merely to avoid liability [due to the fact that] Hosanna–Tabor 
treated Perich like a minister and held her out to the world as such 
long before this litigation began.”81 With this observation, the court 
identified the most tremendous advantage the ministerial exception 
can provide religious employers. Alarmingly, in like situations, a 
religious employer may have no conception of the ministerial 
exception. Indeed, the employer may have no idea such an 
exemption even exists. Should a discrimination suit like Perich’s 
come along, however, the employer’s lawyer will surely know of the 
exception’s expansion. How to tell the difference between the 
exception’s proper application and its troubling abuse by employers 
becomes perhaps the defining problem arising from the doctrine’s 
expansion. 
c. Sixth Circuit Ruling: Outside the Ministerial Exception’s 
Scope 
In its reversal, the Sixth Circuit found it to be “clear that Perich’s 
primary function was teaching secular subjects, not ‘spreading the 
faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or 
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.’”82 As a 
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result of these “factual findings relating to Perich’s primary duties,” 
the Sixth Circuit held that “the district court erred in its legal 
conclusion classifying Perich as a ministerial employee.”83 While 
the district court had placed significant weight on the school’s actual 
classification of Perich as a called teacher, the Sixth Circuit 
employed the popular primary duties test, examining Perich from 
the outside looking in. The court considered whether Perich acted as 
a minister in her daily role and activities.84 Furthermore, the Sixth 
Circuit argued that the district court’s conclusion of Perich as a 
ministerial employee, “[g]iven the undisputed evidence that all 
teachers at Hosanna–Tabor were assigned the same duties . . . would 
compel the conclusion that all teachers at the school—called, 
contract, Lutheran, and non-Lutheran—are similarly excluded from 
coverage under the ADA and other federal fair employment laws.”85 
Reasoning that such a drastic extension of the exception’s scope 
would be illogical, the Sixth Circuit defined the “intent of the 
ministerial exception [as] allow[ing] religious organizations to 
prefer members of their own religion and adhere to their own 
religious interpretations.”86 While the court may have captured the 
exception’s purpose as it has expanded, this contention does not 
comport with the exception’s original intent, which is problematic 
for the ministerial exception to the present day. Finally, although the 
district court did not view the school’s assertion of the ministerial 
exception as simply a “way out” of its employment relationship with 
Perich, Judge White’s concurring opinion questioned the school’s 
motive, pointing out evidence that “the school itself did not envision 
its teachers as religious leaders, or as occupying ‘ministerial’ 
roles.”87 
The incongruity between the district and circuit courts 
exemplifies the widespread disagreement among lower courts 
attempting to define the ministerial exception’s scope.88 These 
disparate rulings and the Supreme Court’s decision to review the 
case89 accentuate the issue’s pertinence.90 A balance must be struck 
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 84. The court pertinently commented: “The fact that Perich participated in 
and led some religious activities throughout the day does not make her primary 
function religious.” Id. 
 85. Id. at 781. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 784 (White, J., concurring). For Judge White, this evidence “[t]ip[s] 
the scale against the ministerial exception in this case.” Id. 
 88. See infra Part II.C–D. 
 89. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Hosanna–Tabor on 
March 28, 2011. See Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (mem.). 




between the preservation of free religion and protection from unjust 
discrimination. The circumstances surrounding Hosanna–Tabor 
frame the necessity for a change to be made in dealing with similar 
cases. The law must protect employees from inequitable 
discrimination more substantially than leaving the matter to a court’s 
discretion. 
II. IN SEARCH OF CONSISTENCY: THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION’S 
VARYING APPLICATION 
Since the Fifth Circuit handed down McClure in 1972, the 
ministerial exception has morphed without much restraint or regard 
for the precedent its expansion has set. In case law from McClure to 
the present, the considerable expansion, and occasional retraction, 
has left uncertain the ministerial exception’s proper scope of 
application. By tracing varying approaches to the ministerial 
exception since its inception in McClure, it becomes apparent that 
Hosanna–Tabor presented a unique opportunity for clarification of 
this elusive doctrine. 
A. Setting the Limit with McClure 
While the Fifth Circuit left McClure without a legal remedy, 
such a seemingly unfair result grows out of a likely sensible rule. To 
protect churches from state interference in matters involving their 
ministers, undoubtedly matters of “prime ecclesiastical concern,”91 
courts will simply refrain from ruling. For a moment, one ought to 
consider the effects of an opposite ruling by the Fifth Circuit in this 
case and by similarly situated courts. The court’s hypothetical 
intervention between The Salvation Army and McClure—a church 
and its minister—would risk setting a dangerous precedent and 
might constitute state regulation in the church realm. Any thought to 
entire abandonment of the foundational rule for the ministerial 
exception under McClure vanishes with contemplation of such a far-
fetched opposite ruling. 
In numerous cases since McClure, however, the ministerial 
exception has applied in questionable sets of circumstances.92 
McClure’s impact, therefore, on the ministerial exception is arguably 
twofold. First, most importantly, McClure birthed the ministerial 
                                                                                                             
 
 90. For a discussion of the Supreme Court ruling in Hosanna–Tabor, see 
infra Part V. 
 91. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 92. See discussion infra Part II.D. 




exception. Second, McClure set the ministerial exception’s limited 
scope as encompassing the church–minister relationship. Perhaps 
the ministerial exception should be codified like the statutory 
exceptions; however, until this legislative enactment, great peril 
would lie in the exception’s complete unavailability to courts 
properly wishing to stay out of prime church matters. 
B. Opening the Door with Rayburn 
In the sense that it serves as a strong source for the expanded 
ministerial exception, Rayburn is perplexing. The Fourth Circuit 
likely could have resolved the issue before it with a no-frills 
application of the McClure rule. The ministerial exception under 
McClure93 might have barred the woman’s claim, as long as the 
court considered the Seventh-Day Adventist Church to be a church 
and the pastoral position as that of a minister. Reaching beyond 
McClure to maintain that “[a]s a general rule, if the employee’s 
primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church 
governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or 
participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she should be 
considered ‘clergy,’”94 the Rayburn court effectively opened the 
door for employees other than ministers to fit within the ministerial 
exception’s purview. For the facts before it, the court did not need to 
reach so far. Nonetheless, its reaching set the stage for expansion all 
the way to Hosanna–Tabor and for placement of the doctrine 
squarely before the Supreme Court. 
C. Original Intent Approaches to the Ministerial Exception: In Line 
with McClure 
Aside from Rayburn, courts have varied in their application of 
the ministerial exception.95 While some have fallen in line with the 
exception’s original intent from McClure, others have added 
kindling to the Rayburn fire. The inconsistent results fostered by the 
ministerial exception establish the wide discretion afforded courts 
with the doctrine’s expanded scope. The remedy must come in the 
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form of an adjusted inquiry or test. As this section demonstrates, the 
McClure scope strikes the proper balance. 
1. EEOC v. Mississippi College 
Championing the original intent approach to the ministerial 
exception, the Fifth Circuit in EEOC v. Mississippi College96 
clarified that “[i]n McClure, this court expressly restricted its 
decision to the context of the church–minister relationship.”97 As a 
religious institution, Mississippi College sought exemption from 
Title VII coverage after refusing to interview Dr. Patricia Summers 
for a psychology professorship.98 Summers had subsequently filed a 
sex discrimination charge against the College.99 In considering the 
College’s contention of coverage within the ministerial exception’s 
scope, the court refused applicability: 
The facts distinguish this case from McClure. The College is 
not a church. The College’s faculty and staff do not function 
as ministers. The faculty members are not intermediaries 
between a church and its congregation. They neither attend to 
the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the 
whole of religious doctrine. That faculty members are 
expected to serve as exemplars of practicing Christians does 
not serve to make the terms and conditions of their 
employment matters of church administration and thus purely 
of ecclesiastical concern. The employment relationship 
between Mississippi College and its faculty and staff is one 
intended by Congress to be regulated by Title VII.100 
By the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, if McClure set forth the 
ministerial exception, the doctrine, properly construed, “exempts . . . 
only the relationship between a church and its minister and does not 
apply to the relationship between a religious educational institution 
and its faculty.”101 Faithful to McClure’s original interpretation of 
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 97. Id. at 485. 
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the ministerial exception, the Fifth Circuit contemplated the 
dangerous effects of an opposite ruling and reached a reasonable 
result.102 More importantly, however, the court arrived at its 
conclusion by way of the proper inquiry, indeed the paramount issue 
of all. 
2. Rweyemamu v. Cote 
While Mississippi College preceded Rayburn, several decisions 
since Rayburn have given occasion for a similar approach in 
adhering to the church–minister relationship under McClure. Some 
cases have been easier for courts than others. For example, 
Rweyemamu v. Cote103 presented an opportunity for straightforward 
application of the McClure scope. Father Justinian Rweyemamu104 
brought a claim for “racial discrimination in a Title VII suit against 
the Bishop and the Diocese”105 that had denied Father Justinian a 
promotion.106 As a Roman Catholic priest, Father Justinian’s “duties 
[were] determined by Catholic doctrine.”107 The Second Circuit 
concluded that it “need not attempt to delineate the boundaries of the 
ministerial exception here, as we find that Father Justinian’s Title 
VII claim easily falls within them.”108 Reaching past McClure, 
however, the Second Circuit recognized the current trend of 
expansion after Rayburn: “The ministerial exception protects more 
than just ‘ministers.’”109 
                                                                                                             
 102. The Fifth Circuit considered the critical roles that schools play in society, 
what with their impact on young, easily influenced students: 
Although the number of religious educational institutions is minute in 
comparison to the number of employers subject to Title VII, their effect 
upon society at large is great because of the role they play in educating 
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achieve their religious and educational goals reflects unlawful 
discrimination, those discriminatory attitudes will be perpetuated with an 
influential segment of society, the detrimental effect of which cannot be 
estimated. 
Id. Without question, the court recognized the seriousness surrounding the concept 
of discrimination and understood the need for its cessation in American law and 
society. 
 103. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 104. Father Justinian was “an African-American Catholic priest.” Id. at 200. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 199. 
 107. Id. at 209. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 206 (citations omitted). 




3. Guinan and Redhead 
Other cases such as Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
Indianapolis110 and Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists111 presented fact patterns ripe for a McClure approach and 
results that an original intent analysis would uphold. When a former 
elementary school teacher in Indiana brought an ADEA claim against 
her archdiocesan employer, the district court in Guinan held the 
employee’s teacher status to bar application of the ministerial 
exception.112 Although the former teacher “did participate in some 
religious activities as a teacher at All Saints . . . it cannot be fairly said 
that she functioned as a minister or member of the clergy.”113 
Likewise, the district court in Redhead refused ministerial exception 
coverage to a religious school whose former teacher was allegedly 
fired “for being pregnant and unmarried.”114 The court held that 
“plaintiff [was] not a clergy member and her duties at the Linden 
School were primarily secular.”115 As in Rweyemamu, state and 
federal courts, like those even in Guinan and Redhead, similarly 
cannot resist the urge to recognize the ministerial exception’s 
broadening application beyond McClure, as the next set of cases 
showcasing the doctrine’s expansion accentuates further.116 
D. The Ministerial Exception’s Sprawling Scope: In Line with 
Rayburn 
Beyond the Fourth Circuit’s expansive reading of the ministerial 
exception, courts have continued creaking open the door, heavy with 
consequences, that Rayburn left adequately cracked. Had certain 
courts construed these broadening cases under the doctrine’s 
original intent, many employees would have passed properly 
through the litigation process. Instead, the ministerial exception 
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afforded these employees no remedy, leaving “[a]ny hope they may 
have had for attaining justice [to have] come and passed.”117 
1. Stately v. Indian Community School of Milwaukee 
As a prime example, Stately v. Indian Community School of 
Milwaukee118 concerned a teacher who claimed that her private-
school employer terminated her position due to her race and 
religion. In assessing whether the ministerial exception barred 
Stately’s discrimination claim, the court maintained that the 
evaluation “begs two questions: (1) Is ICS [the school] a religious 
institution entitled to the protection of the First Amendment? and, if 
so, (2) Was Stately’s position a ministerial one?”119 
In proposing this test, the district court jettisoned the McClure 
inquiry. Instead of ascertaining whether the school was a church, the 
contention that “Native American religions typically satisfy any 
constitutional test for ‘religion’”120 informed the conclusion that 
“the Court accepts, on this record, that ICS is a religious 
institution.”121 The court further traded in contemplation of whether 
Stately, as a teacher, was a minister for the following line of 
reasoning: “when a party acts as a liaison between a religious 
institution and ‘those whom it would touch with its message,’ she is 
acting in a ministerial role.”122 On this logic and “[g]iven her 
instrumental role in developing the spiritual life of her Native 
American students, Stately’s position was unquestionably 
ministerial,” according to the court.123 
The ministerial exception landscape from McClure to Stately is 
puzzling. A doctrine intended to exempt the church–minister 
relationship has somehow expanded to encompass the nexus 
between a teacher and her Native American school employer. 
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2. Petruska, Catholic University, and Hollins 
Circuit courts also have utilized the ministerial exception’s 
widened scope to preclude otherwise valid discrimination claims from 
properly proceeding. Petruska v. Gannon University,124 another 
decision considering application of the ministerial exception in a 
school setting, held that “[t]he function of Petruska’s position as 
University Chaplain was ministerial in nature, and therefore, her 
[claims] must be dismissed.”125 The court neglected to consider the 
potential gap between a church, as in McClure, and a religious 
institution employer like Gannon University.126 
In EEOC v. Catholic University of America,127 the circuit court 
for the District of Columbia evaluated Sister Elizabeth McDonough’s 
sex discrimination claim. Sister McDonough contended that her 
employer, Catholic University, had discriminated against her in 
denying her a tenured position to teach Canon Law. Near the outset of 
its analysis, the court employed interesting diction to suggest the 
common application of the doctrine: “As stated earlier . . . other 
courts have extended the exception to include employees of religious 
institutions whose duties are religious in nature.”128 Not only is this 
assertion rife with shades of Rayburn and the primary duties test, but 
the use of the term extended operates as an admission of how other 
courts have expanded the ministerial exception beyond its intended 
purpose in McClure. 
The Sixth Circuit utilized similar terminology in Hollins v. 
Methodist Healthcare, Inc.129 Even though it had “thus far applied the 
ministerial exception only to ordained ministers[,] other circuits have 
extended the doctrine to bar employment discrimination claims 
brought by other employees of a religions institution.”130 The Hollins 
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court clearly strayed from McClure: “in order to invoke the exception, 
an employer need not be a traditional religious organization such as a 
church, diocese, or synagogue, or an entity operated by a traditional 
religious organization.”131 As a result, the court held the ministerial 
exception to cover Hollins, “a resident in the [Methodist Hospital’s] 
clinical pastoral education program.”132 
Perhaps one cannot blame courts for similar reasoning due to the 
prior expansion of the doctrine. The effect, however, of such 
decisions is chilling. In McClure, the Fifth Circuit worried that any 
interference between a church and its minister would risk 
unconstitutional church–state confrontation. An expansive ministerial 
exception, however, risks leaving unwary employees without a 
remedy and cast aside from the law’s protection. Meanwhile, 
insulated employers take a free pass, facing no consequences despite 
potential discrimination. 
III. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR THE 
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
Several scholars have recommended fixes to the nebulous 
ministerial exception.133 These proposals for ministerial exception 
adjustment vary in nature. Some call for a broadened standard,134 
while others align with the present narrowing proposition.135 
Whatever the scholarly sway, each suggestion for doctrinal shift 
responds to the expansion136 of an exception that is “supposed to 
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serve the valid tolerant goals of keeping the state from interpreting 
religious dogma, intruding on church autonomy, and imposing 
clergy on the churches.”137 
A. Proposals for a Broad Ministerial Exception 
On the broadening end of the spectrum, the primary duties test, 
as endorsed by Rayburn and other cases, may appear unworkable, 
prompting a call for “the ministerial exception [to] encompass all 
employment decisions made by churches.”138 Such a vast standard 
would simplify the ministerial exception inquiry to one question—
whether the employer involved is a church. If so, any and all of its 
employees would come within the ministerial exception’s purview. 
Alternatively, the ministerial exception could broaden through 
continued usage of the primary duties test by extending “a religious 
organization’s assertion that its employee is a minister . . . a rebuttable 
presumption.”139 Under this standard, religious organizations 
including and beyond churches would have the ability “to make 
employment decision[s] based on the furtherance of their religious 
mission without consideration of legal ramifications and litigation.”140 
Whether through the all-encompassing or rebuttable presumption 
standard, such a tremendously overbroad ministerial exception would 
immediately envelop more than proper ministers—a reach far beyond 
McClure that risks sacrificing antidiscrimination safeguards. 
                                                                                                             
 
hire as they wish without court interference. In other words, antidiscrimination is 
not the same for religious as it is for secular organizations.”). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Dunlap, supra note 134, at 2033. 
 139. Cole, supra note 134, at 737. Mr. Cole continues:  
Under a rebuttable presumption, as long as a religious organization 
considers a position essential to the furtherance of its religious mission, it 
can make employment decisions in regard to that position with the 
security and confidence that its decisions will be protected by the 
ministerial exception. Thus, if a church takes the position that an 
employee’s primary duties are important to the furtherance of that 
organization’s spiritual and pastoral mission, the burden would be on the 
employee–plaintiff to establish that he or she is not a minister. This 
would allow religious organizations to make employment decisions on 
the basis of their own personal and doctrinal assessments of who would 
best further their religious mission. 
Id. at 737–38. 
 140. Id. at 737 (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 
772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985)).  




B. Proposals for a Narrow Ministerial Exception 
On the other hand, considerations of congressional intent141 
along with equality and fairness inform the need for a narrower, 
more historically based ministerial exception. Calls for new tests 
abound in scholarly work.142 Moving closer to a more narrowly 
drawn ministerial exception, “the judiciary should not be swayed by 
cries of ‘religious liberty.’”143 Instead, perhaps “so far as the 
Constitution permits, courts should hold religious employers 
accountable for their discriminatory acts.”144 Contrary to their 
broadening counterparts, narrowing proposals commonly recognize 
the need to consider the seriousness of the matter at hand. A more 
expansive ministerial exception may be easier for a court to apply by 
enhancing judicial efficiency and advancing a simple standard for 
public comprehension.145 A narrower exception, however, 
acknowledges that these cases involve real people who may have 
been victims of unfair discrimination. An expansive ministerial 
exception “becomes particularly troublesome when the employee 
who has suffered adverse employment action is not a ‘minister’ by 
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title; instead, he or she might be a principal, a teacher, or even a 
press secretary.”146 While development of the ministerial exception 
has passed from the McClure church–minister question to the 
primary duties inquiry, perhaps “applying a narrower standard to 
determine whether a teacher actually functions as a minister would 
lead to results becoming more consistent, both with one another and 
with the ministerial exception’s original purpose.”147 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S 
RELIGION CLAUSES 
Any court considering application of the ministerial exception 
necessarily contemplates the two Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment.148 The ministerial exception’s utility springs from its 
attempt “to preserve the First Amendment’s two guarantees, which 
provide that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’”149 Accordingly, 
the present call for the exception’s narrowing must grapple with these 
constitutional provisions. While one cannot overemphasize the First 
Amendment’s paramount importance, its application should not 
extend so far as to prevent possible discrimination cases outside the 
church–minister context from litigation proceedings. 
A. The Establishment Clause 
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause essentially 
prevents the government from instituting or supporting a particular 
religion or church.150 Though it has not gone without its 
detractors,151 a three-part test to determine whether an action 
violates the Establishment Clause surfaced in Lemon v. Kurtzman:152 
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
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inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’”153 For the Supreme Court 
in Lemon, “[i]n order to determine whether the government 
entanglement of religion is excessive, we must examine the 
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the 
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting 
relationship between the government and the religious authority.”154 
The ministerial exception implicates Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the ADEA, and the ADA.155 These statutes satisfy the 
first two parts of the Lemon test, leaving the third and final prong as 
the relevant inquiry.156 Application of Title VII, the ADEA, and the 
ADA to employees of religious institutions outside the church–
minister relationship, under this test, should not constitute excessive 
entanglement. If these statutory provisions encompass some 
religious employees, the government does not endorse a particular 
religion, provide a church with any aid, or forge a relationship with 
a religious authority. Instead, the court examines discriminatory 
allegations and adjudicates their merits—just as it would with any 
other type of employer. Under the Lemon test, a narrower ministerial 
exception should not present any entanglement problems. 
At times, the Supreme Court has not found the Lemon test useful 
in evaluating whether conduct conflicts with the Establishment 
Clause. For example, Van Orden v. Perry157 presented the question 
of whether a stone monument of the Ten Commandments near the 
Texas State Capitol violated the Establishment Clause.158 Finding 
the Lemon test unhelpful, the Court held that Texas’s Ten 
Commandments display did not violate the Establishment Clause,159 
even though the monument’s placement arguably risks perception as 
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state endorsement of Christianity. While different from the 
ministerial exception inquiry, Van Orden demonstrates that the 
Establishment Clause will tolerate at least some governmental 
interaction with religion. Likewise, the First Amendment should 
tolerate application of antidiscrimination safeguards to individuals 
short of the pure church–minister relationship. 
B. The Free Exercise Clause 
A survey of case law interpreting these religious provisions 
suggests that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses “dance 
around each other, sometimes appearing distinct, and sometimes 
overlapping.”160 In the ministerial exception context, McClure itself 
fixated on the Free Exercise Clause and its demands.161 After 
suggesting that “the First Amendment has built a ‘wall of 
separation’ between church and state,” the McClure court conceded 
that the government may impose on church matters when a 
compelling state interest to do so is present.162 The court maintained 
that “[r]estrictions on the free exercise of religion are allowed only 
when it is necessary ‘to prevent grave and immediate danger to 
interests which the state may lawfully protect.’”163 
The McClure court additionally discussed the relevant Supreme 
Court ruling of Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.164 In striking 
down a New York law as unconstitutional, the Kedroff Court “stated 
that ‘legislation that regulates church administration, the operation 
of churches [or] the appointment of clergy . . . prohibits the free 
exercise of religion.’”165 The McClure court looked to a few 
different cases and noted the similarity among them: 
A common thread runs through these opinions, which is best 
exemplified by those words used by the Supreme Court in 
commenting on its holding in Watson v. Jones. For 
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throughout these opinions there exists “a spirit of freedom 
for religious organizations, an independence from secular 
control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”166  
In sum, the McClure court held application of Title VII to the 
church–minister relationship as an action that would encroach upon 
the Free Exercise Clause, causing “the State to intrude upon matters 
of church administration and government which have so many times 
before been proclaimed to be matters of a singular ecclesiastical 
concern.”167 Allowing the court to apply Title VII in this way would 
“inject[] the State into substantive ecclesiastical matters,” which the 
Free Exercise Clause will not tolerate.168 
Since the ministerial exception’s expansion in Rayburn, courts 
have often tapped the Free Exercise Clause as the mechanism 
prohibiting application of antidiscrimination safeguards to individuals 
other than proper church ministers.169 For example, Starkman v. 
Evans170 involved a Methodist church choir director who claimed that 
her employer had improperly terminated her position due to her 
disability. In considering whether Starkman was a minister, the Fifth 
Circuit postulated that “if Ms. Starkman’s position as a choir director 
merely required her to ‘perform tasks which are not traditionally 
ecclesiastical or religious,’ the Church is not ‘entitled to McClure-
type protection’ under the Free Exercise Clause.”171 Oppositely, if 
Starkman had been required to perform ecclesiastical tasks, the 
ministerial exception by the court’s logic would have applied. In this 
light, the Rayburn expansion to the primary duties test corresponds 
with a similar inquiry regarding whether an employee’s tasks are 
ecclesiastical in nature. Accordingly, the Rayburn expansion may 
constitute an attempt to align the ministerial exception inquiry with 
the demands of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Due to the “ambiguity surrounding First Amendment religious 
freedoms, the reach of the ministerial exception varies from circuit 
to circuit, depending on the court’s interpretation of the extent to 
which the First Amendment protects the conduct of religious 
                                                                                                             
 166. Id. at 560 (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See, e.g., Stately v. Indian Cmty. Sch. of Milwaukee, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 
2d 858 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 170. Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 171. Id. at 175 (quoting EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 285 
(5th Cir. 1981)). 




organizations.”172 For a narrower ministerial exception to prevail, it 
must comport with the contours of the First Amendment. With an 
expansive ministerial exception, courts may afford the First 
Amendment more influence than the key societal policy of allowing 
discrimination claims to proceed. Under the McClure reasoning, the 
suppression of employment discrimination should qualify as a 
“compelling state interest” and as a policy that prevents “grave and 
immediate danger” to society.173 Qualification as such would free 
employees outside of the church–minister relationship from Free 
Exercise Clause limitation. Furthermore, though courts may 
consider whether an employee performs ecclesiastical tasks, the 
ecclesiastical question should focus specifically on the church–
minister relationship, as it did in McClure. The ecclesiastical nature 
of a church’s minister is obvious, while the duties inquiry can lead 
to inconsistent results in the same way as the expanded ministerial 
exception. 
Narrowing the exception’s scope strikes the proper balance 
between the competing concerns of the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses and the policy considerations of curtailing employment 
discrimination. In construing the First Amendment, courts must not 
lose sight of the Constitution as a whole. The Framers established 
their purpose for drafting their founding document in the 
Constitution’s Preamble: “in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, . . . [and] promote the general Welfare.”174 
Through the lens of this admirable goal, an expansive ministerial 
exception that prevents potential discrimination claims from 
equitable remedies conflicts with the Framers’ intent. The 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment 
may impede a narrow ministerial exception; however, the ends of 
justice and societal welfare deserve equal weight. A ministerial 
exception limited to the pure church–minister relationship would 
balance these competing interests fairly. 
V. TO WASHINGTON: THE SUPREME COURT’S SAY AND FINE-TUNING 
FOR THE FUTURE 
At its core, extended application of the ministerial exception 
potentially forces an agonizing, detrimental impact on unwary 
employees. Past courts, in some cases, have refused adequate 
protection of these individuals, further necessitating the Supreme 
Court to have its say. With Hosanna–Tabor, the Court had the chance 
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to set the ministerial exception record straight.175 Though the Court 
did not expressly construe the exception in its original form under 
McClure, it came close—unanimously finding the exception to cover 
the plaintiff, yet refusing to announce a formal test for the ministerial 
exception.176 Onward from Hosanna–Tabor, courts ought to adhere 
to the McClure formula in applying the ministerial exception, while 
any additional protections for religious employers outside the 
doctrine, should they be required, ought to be incorporated by 
Congress alongside the statutory exceptions. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Hosanna–Tabor Ruling: Within the 
Ministerial Exception’s Scope 
Near the outset of its analysis, the Court noted the clear import 
of the Constitution’s Religion Clauses, hinting that it would indeed 
recognize the ministerial exception that had bounced around the 
lower courts for decades.177 Prior to inquiring whether the Lutheran 
school teacher, Cheryl Perich, fit within the ministerial exception’s 
purview, the Court provided its rationale for the exception’s 
existence in the first place: 
We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The 
members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of 
their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an 
unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, 
intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such 
action interferes with the internal governance of the church, 
depriving the church of control over the selection of those 
who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted 
minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which 
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and 
mission through its appointments. According the state the 
power to determine which individuals will minister to the 
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faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical 
decisions.178 
Declining to adopt a test for future ministerial exception 
inquiries,179 the Court provided four reasons for reversing the Sixth 
Circuit and concluding that “Perich was a minister covered by the 
ministerial exception”—“the formal title given Perich by the 
Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, 
and the important religious functions she performed for the 
Church.”180 
First, the Court explained how Hosanna–Tabor had “held Perich 
out as a minister,” issuing her a vocational diploma that gave her the 
title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”181 Second, Perich’s title 
“reflected a significant degree of religious training followed by a 
formal process of commissioning.”182 Even as Perich worked 
extensively to complete the colloquy requirements, her 
commissioning as a minister became official “only upon election by 
the congregation, which recognized God’s call to her to teach.”183 
Third, the Court found Perich to have held herself out as a minister 
through actions, among others, such as claiming on her taxes a 
housing allowance “available only to employees earning their 
compensation ‘in the exercise of the ministry.’”184 Finally, the Court 
contemplated Perich’s function in her day-to-day tasks, clarifying 
that her “job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s 
message and carrying out its mission.”185 
With this fourth and final consideration, the primary duties test 
clearly surfaced; however, this test, popular in so many prior lower 
court decisions, did not comprise the sole ministerial exception 
inquiry for the Supreme Court. In fact, the Court faulted the Sixth 
Circuit for overemphasizing Perich’s duties.186 Most notably, the 
Sixth Circuit “gave too much weight to the fact that lay teachers at 
the school performed the same religious duties as Perich” and 
“placed too much emphasis on Perich’s performance of secular 
duties.”187 By taking issue with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, the 
Supreme Court effectively derailed any thought that the primary 
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duties test, though relevant as one part of its inquiry,188 would itself 
determine the outcome in this case: 
[The Sixth Circuit] did regard the relative amount of time 
Perich spent performing religious functions as largely 
determinative. The issue before us, however, is not one that 
can be resolved by a stopwatch. The amount of time an 
employee spends on particular activities is relevant in 
assessing that employee’s status, but that factor cannot be 
considered in isolation, without regard to the nature of the 
religious functions performed and the other considerations 
discussed above.189 
Among those other considerations, the Court further faulted the 
Sixth Circuit for “fail[ing] to see any relevance in the fact that 
Perich was a commissioned minister.”190 Though “such a title, by 
itself, does not automatically ensure coverage,” according to the 
Court, “the fact that an employee has been ordained or 
commissioned as a minister is surely relevant.”191 The Court notably 
pointed to the intensive training Perich had completed to obtain her 
title, as well as the “recognized religious mission” at the core of her 
position.192 As such, the Court found it “wrong for the Court of 
Appeals . . . to say that an employee’s title does not matter.”193 
These several errors thus militated against Perich’s case. The 
ministerial exception would not only prohibit Perich’s recovery, but 
it would preclude her suit altogether. Announcing its holding in 
absolute terms, the Court raised the constitutional shield, leaving the 
“Church” free to make its own employment decisions regarding its 
“ministers”: 
Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the 
exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this 
employment discrimination suit against her religious 
employer. The EEOC and Perich originally sought an order 
reinstating Perich to her former position as a called teacher. 
By requiring the Church to accept a minister it did not want, 
such an order would have plainly violated the Church’s 
freedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own 
ministers.194 
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Though referencing McClure elsewhere as the exception’s 
foundation,195 the Court could have cited McClure in its holding. 
This formulation of the ministerial exception inquiry grows out of 
the McClure original intent standard, springing forth the exception’s 
roots as a guidebook for the future. 
B. Fine-Tuning and Collapsing the Expansive Approach 
On the Hosanna–Tabor appeal, the Sixth Circuit employed a 
dual-pronged approach to determine whether Perich fit within the 
ministerial exception—an approach appropriate due to the 
expansion this key doctrine has endured yet one in need of some 
historically based fine-tuning, which the Supreme Court would 
eventually provide. In general terms, for the ministerial exception to 
apply under the Sixth Circuit’s scope, “the employer must be a 
religious institution” and “the employee must be a ministerial 
employee.”196 In deciding that Perich ultimately did not fit within 
the ministerial exception, the Sixth Circuit crafted its opinion based 
on the expanded inquiry, as in cases like Stately, Petruska, Hollins, 
and others.197 The court could have used a history lesson in order to 
frame the test more faithfully to the ministerial exception’s original 
construction. 
When the Sixth Circuit court chose to conduct a ministerial 
exception inquiry, it should have done its homework on the 
doctrine’s original intent as established in McClure: “We therefore 
hold that Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording 
of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment 
relationship between church and minister.”198 As the ministerial 
exception has been applied to cases implicating the ADA and other 
federal employment discrimination regulations, the court felt a 
ministerial exception inquiry to be appropriate; however, the court 
should have considered whether Perich’s employer was a “church” 
and whether Perich as employee was its “minister,” as McClure set 
forth. 
Under the narrower McClure test, each of the two prongs 
utilized in the Sixth Circuit’s Hosanna–Tabor test effectively 
collapses. The first prong breaks down from the broader inquiry of 
whether the employer qualifies as a “religious institution” to the 
narrower question of whether the employer is a “church.” One need 
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only look to Hollins199 to learn that the expanded inquiry for the first 
“religious institution” prong, as reflected in the Sixth Circuit’s 
Hosanna–Tabor decision, is not limited to churches and the like but 
apparently extends to religious entities and beyond.200 
Similar to the first, the second prong collapses from the broader 
inquiry of whether the employee occupied a “ministerial” role—that 
is, one who performs ministerial duties—to the narrower question of 
whether the employee is a “minister.” Though it may seem a small, 
insignificant shift in terminology, the difference between one who is 
a “minister” and one whose occupation is “ministerial” in nature can 
be substantial. For example, if a lay individual is hired to work as a 
religion teacher, his day-to-day tasks may arguably be ministerial in 
nature; however, he likely, and quite reasonably, considers himself a 
religion teacher—not a minister of the church. This contrast draws a 
fine distinction, but it makes a noteworthy difference with 
potentially far-reaching implications.201 
The Supreme Court has at least begun to move in the McClure 
direction. Three key areas of its Hosanna–Tabor majority opinion 
showcase this critical progression.202 First, the Supreme Court’s 
definitive recognition that the ministerial exception indeed occupies 
a niche in employment discrimination law repeatedly uses the terms 
church and minister to describe the exception’s nature.203 In 
contrast, previous lower court decisions endorsing an expansive 
approach to the exception queried broadly whether the employer 
was “religious” and whether the position at issue was a “ministerial” 
one.204 Second, the Court refused to classify the Rayburn primary 
duties test as the ministerial exception’s dispositive inquiry.205 
Third, the Court’s holding classified Perich as a “minister” and her 
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employer as a “church” in the same way that the Fifth Circuit in 
1972 identified McClure as a “minister” who had been unjustly 
discharged by her employer “church.”206 For the Supreme Court, 
“[w]hen a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that 
her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck 
the balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who will 
guide it on its way.”207 
C. Moving Forward: Thoughts for the Future 
The Supreme Court’s review of Hosanna–Tabor presented the 
perfect opportunity for articulation of a test reflecting the ministerial 
exception’s original intent. The Court refused to announce such a 
test.208 The Court, however, upheld application of the ministerial 
exception due to (i) the fact that Perich’s employer was a church and 
(ii) the fact that Perich, as employee, was a minister of her employer 
church. This finding faithfully adheres to the pure ministerial 
exception, as McClure originally intended. 
Though the majority opinion reads as if inching back toward 
McClure, doubt remains as to whether all justices are fully on 
board.209 In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito, joined by Justice 
Kagan, held fast to “[t]he functional consensus [that] has held up 
over time.”210 In the first place, Justice Alito maintained that courts 
faced with ministerial exception cases “should focus on the function 
performed by persons who work for religious bodies.”211 For Justice 
Alito, as in Rayburn and other primary duties cases, the exception 
“should apply to any ‘employee’ who leads a religious organization, 
conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or 
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rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.”212 
Concurring with the majority that Perich still fit this functional 
inquiry—closely resembling the primary duties test of many lower 
courts—the Court reached a unanimous result; however, the 
appropriate inquiry or proper test to arrive at this result remains 
clearly unsettled.213 
At the end of the day, any further expansion on the pure church–
minister ministerial exception must come through legislation. 
Congress has already set forth statutory exceptions related to 
religion.214 In addition to the religious organization, religious 
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decision to rule on a ministerial exception case with Cannata v. Catholic Diocese 
of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012). Echoing the Supreme Court, the Fifth 
Circuit noted that “it may not be possible to develop a one-size-fits-all approach to 
the ministerial exception.” Id. at 176. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
plaintiff–music director terminated by his church employer fit within the 
ministerial exception “[b]ecause [he] performed an important function during the 
service” and “played a role in furthering the mission of the church and conveying 
its message to its congregants.” Id. at 180. Though reflecting that “the ministerial 
exception permits the church to pick its own ministers and do so using its own 
criteria,” the Fifth Circuit in Cannata read the functional–primary-duties test as 
determinative rather than as one part of the “minister” inquiry. Id. at 179. Other 
lower court cases since the Supreme Court’s Hosanna–Tabor ruling likewise 
demonstrate the lacking consensus. See, e.g., Headley v. Church of Scientology 
Int’l, 687 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The district court was right to 
recognize that courts may not scrutinize many aspects of the minister–church 
relationship.”); Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, No. 11 C 5480, 2012 WL 
3134337, at *4–6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2012) (holding a called teacher in strikingly 
like circumstances to Perich as fitting within the ministerial exception under a 
similar analysis as the Supreme Court in Hosanna–Tabor); Dias v. Archdiocese of 
Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 
2012) (holding a Technology Coordinator and teacher at a Catholic school outside 
the ministerial exception as she “had received no religious training or title and had 
no religious duties”). 
 214. See supra Part I.A. Courts have wrestled readily with statutory exception 
language in the employment discrimination field. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha 
Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying the religious 
organization, religious curriculum, and BFOQ exceptions to an employer–school 
that had terminated a teacher because she was not Protestant); LeBoon v. 
Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr., 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007) (extending the religious 
organization exception to a “primarily religious” employer that had fired a 
bookkeeper allegedly on account of her Christianity); Spencer v. World Vision, 
Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1316, 2011 WL 4530150, 
at *1 (Oct. 3, 2011) (mem.) (extending the religious organization exception to a 




curriculum, and BFOQ exceptions, ordinary employers must 
accommodate their employees’ religious beliefs,215 further 
exemplifying the critical consideration that Congress has attributed 
these delicate matters. Perhaps the statutory exceptions currently in 
place do not go far enough. One may likewise argue that the 
protections courts have granted employers over the years by virtue 
of the extended ministerial exception are fair and sensible. For 
religious protections and exceptions to be consistently and fairly 
applied, however, Congress should establish these safeguards. 
Otherwise, the unbridled, unpredictable expansion of the judge-
made ministerial exception risks unjust discrimination, with the 
employer ultimately suffering no consequences for perhaps unfairly 
terminating or refusing to hire a particular individual. 
CONCLUSION 
With the statutory exceptions, all courts grapple with the same 
language that seeks to elicit one clear standard. Congress has set 
clear statutes for courts to interpret as they deem proper. Unlike its 
statutory counterparts, the ministerial exception stands on unsteady 
footing—its foundation morphing haphazardly depending on the 
court and the doctrine’s previous extension. Thus, no consistent, 
workable standard has emerged. 
To ensure the ministerial exception’s fair application, courts 
should base the doctrine’s scope on a single principle, aligning the 
ministerial exception with the uniform nature of the statutory 
exceptions. Faithful to the ministerial exception’s original intent, 
McClure provides this key foundation. The church–minister 
relationship provided the firm basis for the ministerial exception in 
the first place. Though not itself statutory, the McClure principle 
that a court ought to refuse to regulate the employment relationship 
between a church and its minister should operate as the common 
standard for courts to interpret in the same way that courts wrestle 
with statutory exception language. 
                                                                                                             
 
“primarily religious” employer that had fired three employees for denying Jesus 
Christ and the Holy Trinity). 
 215. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects 
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or a 
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer’s business.”). 




A court’s refusal to dig down and spring forth the ministerial 
exception’s roots to the present day risks attributing too much 
weight to the First Amendment.216 Instead, any further First 
Amendment influence should arise through more numerous 
statutory exceptions. Until Congress effects such legislation, the 
ministerial exception should remain limited to its original scope and 
intent. If not through this original intent remedy, then by some other 
should the ministerial exception narrow to preclude its overbroad 
injurious impact. 
Blair A. Crunk∗ 
                                                                                                             
 216. As this Comment demonstrates, courts have generally favored the First 
Amendment in extending the ministerial exception beyond its original form. See 
discussion supra Parts I.B, II.A–D, IV.A–B. 
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